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Abstract	A	perceptual	realism	that	is	naive	in	a	good	way	must	be	naively	realistic	about	world	and	mind.	But	contemporary	self-described	naive	realists	often	have	trouble	acknowledging	that	 both	 the	 good	 cases	 of	 successful	 perception	 and	 the	 bad	 cases	 of	 illusion	 and	hallucination	involve	internal	experiential	states	with	intentional	contents	that	present	the	 world	 as	 being	 a	 certain	 way.	 They	 prefer	 to	 think	 about	 experience	 solely	 in	relational	 terms	 because	 they	worry	 that	otherwise	we	won’t	 be	 able	 to	 escape	 from	radical	skepticism.	I	argue	that	experiential	relations	to	objects	require	that	their	subjects	be	 in	 internal	 experiential	 states.	 But	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 these	 states	 are	 our	epistemological	starting	point	which	can	be	known	independently	of	any	knowledge	of	the	external	world.	We	do	escape	the	epistemological	predicament	of	radical	skepticism	because	the	good	cases	are	primary	over	the	bad	ones.	But	this	is	not	because	the	good	cases	alone	provide	reasons	for	belief,	but	because	we	do	not	need	a	reason	to	think	we	are	in	a	good	case,	but	do	need	a	reason	to	think	we	are	not,	and	such	a	reason	must	come	from	a	good	case.	So	bad	cases	can	only	be	thought	of	as	deviations	from	good	cases.	And	we	can	only	understand	experiences	as	states	with	contents	distinct	from	their	objects	and	present	in	good	and	bad	cases	once	we	understand	misrepresentation,	that	is,	bad	cases,	and	therefore	only	as	we	ascribe	knowledge	of	the	external	world	to	ourselves.			
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1 Elizabeth Anscombe translated these as follows: “The agreement, the harmony, of thought and reality 
consists in this: if I say falsely that something is red, then, for all that, it isn’t red. And when I want to explain 
the word “red” to someone, in the sentence “That is not red”, I do it by pointing to something red.“ and “To 
use a word without justification does not mean to use it without right.” (Wittgenstein 1958).  
 1. Introduction	We	directly	perceptually	experience	objects	–	things,	properties,	states	of	affairs.	That	is,	for	example,	I	see	a	table,	I	see	its	white	color,	and	I	see	that	it	is	white.	That	I	perceive	these	objects	directly	means	that	I	do	not	first	experience	something	else	–	ideas,	sense	data,	 or	 the	 like	 –	directly	 and	 then	 the	 table	 only	 indirectly.	 But	 which	 objects	 I	experience	 depends	 not	 only	 on	 the	 state	 of	 the	 world	 external	 to	 me,	 but	 on	 my	subjective,	internal,	experiential	state.	It	depends	on	how	the	world	seems	to	me	to	be.	That	is,	it	depends	on	the	content	of	my	experience	–	how	it	presents	the	world	as	being	–	and	on	whether	that	content	matches	how	the	world	really	is.	Usually	it	does.	Illusion	or	 hallucination	 are	 much	 rarer	 than	 one	 might	 suspect	 from	 the	 outsize	 attention	philosophers	have	given	to	them,	but	when	such	misexperiences	do	occur,	they	are	cases	of	contents	without	corresponding	objects.	This	is	a	naively	realistic	view	of	perception	which	seems	like	mere	common	sense	to	me,	 except	 perhaps	 that	 I	 used	 the	 slightly	 technical	 notion	 of	 content.	 Its	 distinctive	feature	on	the	contemporary	theoretical	scene	is	that	it	is	naively	realistic	about	world	
and	 mind.	 This	 is	 worth	 noting	 because	 the	 label	 ‘naive	 realism’	 has	 recently	 been	appropriated	by	views	which	seem	less	than	naively	realistic	about	the	mind.	Such	views	emphasize	 experiential	 relations	 between	 subject	 and	 world,	 but	 are	 shy	 about	acknowledging	 that	 such	 relations	 can	 only	 obtain	 in	 virtue	 of	 a	 subject’s	 inner	experiential	and	intentionally	contentful	states.	But	why	would	anybody	feel	a	tension	between	 embracing	 experiential	 relations	 and	 experiential	 subjective	 states	 if	–	approaching	things	naively	–	it	seems	obvious	that	the	former	could	not	exist	without	the	latter?	I	believe	that	in	order	to	understand	this	and	make	progress	on	the	issue	of	perceptual	realism	we	need	to	engage	in	a	Wittgensteinian	diagnosis	and	therapy	of	the	underlying	concerns.	In	this	spirit,	I	will	provide	a	very	brief	and	schematic	history	and	diagnosis	of	some	of	 these	 concerns	 in	 the	 next	 section.	 In	 the	 third	 section,	 I	 will	 more	 precisely	characterize	 the	 views	 I	 am	 criticizing	 as	 forms	 of	 “austere	 relationism”.	 The	 fourth	section	will	provide	a	blueprint	of	the	positive	view	to	be	defended,	the	fifth	will	address	some	concerns	about	the	central	notion	of	content,	and	the	sixth	the	deep	epistemological	worries	underlying	the	reluctance	to	acknowledge	experience	as	an	inner	state,	before	I	outline	the	positive	alternative	in	the	final	seventh	section.	
2. Subjectivism	vs.	objectivism	At	 least	 since	 Rene	 Descartes,	 philosophy	 has	 been	 torn	 between	 subjectivism	 and	objectivism.	Descartes	made	mind	the	starting	point	of	philosophy	and	created	a	chasm	between	mind	and	world.	While	Descartes	himself	believed	that	this	chasm	could	still	be	bridged	in	a	realistic	fashion,	idealism	and	other	forms	of	subjectivism	despaired	of	this	task	and	instead	tried	to	overcome	this	chasm	by	making	world	dependent	on	mind	or	constructing	 world	 out	 of	 mind.	 For	 subjectivism	 mind	 is	 metaphysically	 and	epistemologically	 primary.	 For	 example,	 phenomenalists	 tried	 to	 construct	 ordinary	
 objects	out	of	sense	data.	Epistemologically,	for	the	subjectivist	ideas,	sensa,	sense	data	etc.	 become	 the	 immediate	 objects	 of	 experience	 and	 thus	 block	 direct	 access	 to	 the	world.	This	also	brings	with	 it	a	view	of	our	awareness	of	our	own	mental	states	 that	seems	 badly	 naive:	 the	 awareness	 of	 ideas	 is	 immediate	 and	 independent	 of	 any	knowledge	of	the	world.	Experience	is	the	epistemological	starting	point	that	supposedly	can	be	made	sense	of	independently	of	whether	we	actually	succeed	in	representing	the	world.	Consequently,	this	success	becomes	very	problematic.	Subjectivism	 dominated	 philosophy	 for	 a	 long	 time,	 but	 in	 the	 20th	 century	philosophers	increasingly	felt	this	was	intolerable.	There	was	a	strong	reaction	against	subjectivism	 and	 objectivist	 viewpoints	 became	 more	 and	 more	 influential.	 For	objectivism	world	is	metaphysically	and	epistemologically	primary.	Mind	is	dependent	on	world	or	can	be	constructed	out	of	world.	For	example,	behaviorists	construed	mental	states	out	of	behavior.	Moving	closer	to	our	present	concerns,	content	externalists	hold	that	mental	content	may	be	determined	through	features	of	the	world	–	e.g.	whether	the	stuff	from	lakes	and	rivers	that	they	drink	is	H2O	or	XYZ	(Putnam	1975)	–	that	subjects	are	unaware	of	–	at	least	in	any	ordinary	sense.	On	the	content	externalist	view,	world	is	partly	constitutive	of	what	subjects	mean	and	think	in	the	sense	that	features	unknown	to	
them	 can	 determine	 it.	 This	 externalism	 was	 then	 sometimes	 invoked	 to	 respond	 to	epistemological	concerns.	Even	if	we	are	brains	in	a	vat	–	in	the	scenario	that	updated	Descartes’	demon	thought	experiment	–	might	not	most	of	our	beliefs	still	be	true	because	our	words	and	thoughts	refer	to	the	regular	causes	of	our	experiences	(Putnam	1981)?	The	price	for	accepting	this	response	to	skepticism	is	that	intuitively	these	causes	–	the	electrical	stimuli	controlled	by	the	evil	neuroscientists	–	are	rather	different	from	what	they	appear	to	be.		Externalism	 is	 still	 orthodox	 in	 contemporary	 philosophy.	 But	 one	 of	 its	 most	perceptive	 critics,	 Donald	 Davidson,	 already	 gave	 a	 compelling	 diagnosis	 of	 its	shortcomings	 very	 early:	 it	 provides	 no	more	 than	 a	 “transposed	 image	 of	 Cartesian	skepticism”	(Davidson	2001:	22).	Davidson’s	point	was	that	now	the	subject	loses	its	grip	on	 its	 own	mental	 states.	 But	 not	 even	 our	 conception	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 these	mental	states	and	the	world	has	really	improved.	The	subject	is	still	just	as	out	of	touch	with	the	world	as	on	the	subjectivist	picture.	The	illusion	that	something	has	improved	substantially	arises	only	because	objectivism	invites	us	 to	 take	an	external,	3rd	person	point	of	view	on	the	situation.	By	adopting	this	point	of	view	we	can	see	what	the	person	really	refers	to	or	what	their	beliefs	are	really	about	(compare	Searle	1983:	230).	But	this	external	determination	is	revealed	as	cold	comfort	when	we	take	up	the	point	of	view	of	the	subject.	From	the	point	of	view	of	the	subject,	the	relevant	features	remain	unknown.	The	abyss	between	mind	and	world	persists:	only	apparent	progress	has	been	made	by	declaring	ostensibly	unknown	features	of	the	world	to	be	constitutive	of	mind.	
3. What	is	“austere	relationism”?	Against	this	historical	background	let	me	now	characterize	more	closely	what	I	think	is		a	
 bad	kind	of	naive	realism,	the	kind	of	view	that	Susanna	Schellenberg	(2011)	has	aptly	called	 “austere	 relationism”.	 According	 to	 austere	 relationism,	 the	 good	 cases	 (of	successful	perception)	and	 the	bad	cases	 (of	 illusion	and	hallucination)	are	not	of	 the	same	kind,	or	at	 least	not	of	 the	same	 fundamental	kind.	Nor	do	the	good	and	the	bad	cases	share	the	property	of	having	intentional	content.	Austere	relationism	is	a	form	of	disjunctivism.	Introspectively,	I	can	only	say	that	my	current	state	is	either	a	perceptual	experience	(relationally	conceived),	or	an	illusion	or	hallucination.	I	cannot	say	that	there	is	a	common	factor	here,	namely	that	they	all	involve	(non-relational)	experiences	with	intentional	content	that	presents	the	world	as	being	a	certain	way.	This	is	what	makes	this	relationism	austere.	Austere	relationists	certainly	deny	that	perceptual	experience	is	representational	and	has	intentional	content,	but	is	their	relationism	so	austere	that	it	rejects	experience	as	an	internal	 subjective	 state	 in	 any	 sense	 at	 all?	 I	don’t	want	 to	make	 such	 an	 accusation	lightly	and	I	am	not	sure	about	all	philosophers	who	have	held	views	in	this	ballpark	of	ideas,	but	certain	things	that	 its	proponents	have	said	(and	have	not	said)	are	hard	to	make	sense	of	otherwise.	For	example,	one	frequently	finds	in	this	literature	claims	like	that	 features	of	 the	external	world	constitute	the	phenomenal	character	of	experience	(e.g.	 Campbell	 2002:	 116).	 For	 example,	 the	 redness	 of	 the	 table	 constitutes	 the	phenomenal	 character	 of	 an	 experience	 of	 redness.	 Since	 the	 notion	 of	 phenomenal	character	was	explicitly	 introduced	to	capture	the	what	 it	 is	 like	of	a	state,	 that	which	makes	it	the	state	of	consciousness	that	it	is,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	this	move	could	not	be	intended	 to	 replace	 any	 notion	 of	 inherent	 subjective	 properties	 of	 perceptual	consciousness.	Nor	 is	 it	 intelligible	how	an	 internal	 state	of	 such	consciousness	 could	even	exist	while	lacking	any	inherent	phenomenal	properties.	A	further	piece	of	evidence:	when	austere	relationists	do	acknowledge	the	obvious	fact	that	there	must	be	internal	enabling	conditions	for	experiential	relations	to	objects	–	that	whether	such	relations	obtain	cannot	only	depend	on	the	state	of	the	world	around	the	 organism,	 but	 must	 also	 depend	 on	 the	 state	 of	 the	 organism	 itself	 –	they	 only	characterize	these	conditions	in	physiological	terms	(Fish	2009),	or	in	terms	of	“cognitive	processing”	(Campbell	2002:	118),	but	not	in	experiential	terms.	But	again:	if	we	want	to	make	 sense	 of	 the	 experiential	 perceptual	 relation,	 we	 need	 an	 internal,	 subjective	experiential	state.	When	I	experience	the	table,	when	I	am	perceptually	conscious	of	it,	it	is	only	me	that	has	an	experience	or	is	in	a	state	of	experience	or	consciousness.	The	table	does	not	experience	anything	and	is	not	part	of	my	experiential	state,	but	just	its	object.	Only	 my	 subjective	 experiential	 state	 can	 turn	 my	 relation	 to	 it	 into	 an	 experiential	relation.	Therefore,	 neither	 subjectivism	nor	objectivism	 can	make	 sense	 of	 the	 perceptual	relation.	Subjectivism	internalizes	it	as	a	relation	between	subjects	and	subjective	items	such	as	ideas	or	sense	data.	It	therefore	fails	to	make	epistemological	sense	of	perceptual	relatedness	to	external	objects,	and	it	is	easy	to	see	why	this	must	be	so:	if	we	can	make	sense	of	experience	independently	of	any	awareness	of	the	external	world,	how	could	it	
 ground	such	awareness?	The	only	escape	then	is	to	try	to	construct	world	out	of	mind.	Conversely,	as	we	have	seen,	austere	relationism	cannot	make	sense	of	the	experiential	perceptual	 relation	 because	 it	 finds	 itself	 unable	 to	 acknowledge	 internal	 subjective	experiential	states,	which	alone	can	turn	this	relation	into	an	experiential	relation.	The	only	escape	then	is	to	try	to	construct	mind	out	of	world,	e.g.	to	claim	that	external	objects	constitute	the	phenomenal	character	of	experience.	I	 believe	 that	 a	 central	 motivation	 for	 this	 and	 other	 kinds	 of	 externalism	 is	epistemological	even	when	these	views	are	not	expressly	presented	as	epistemological.	Putnam	 justified	 his	 version	 of	 content	 externalism	 mostly	 by	 appeal	 to	 semantic	intuitions.	But	a	broader	motivation	was	surely	to	escape	subjectivism	and	to	bring	the	world	(and	our	fellow	creatures)	into	our	theories	of	meaning	and	thought.	And	as	we	saw,	 Putnam	 soon	 tried	 to	 make	 epistemological	 hay	 out	 of	 content	 externalism.	Similarly,	 a	 core	 motivation	 for	 austere	 relationism	 is	 certainly	 the	 idea	 that	 only	experience	 as	 construed	 relationally	 could	 adequately	 ground	 our	 knowledge	 of	 the	world	and	defeat	skepticism.	And	properly	understood,	these	motivations	are	quite	valid.	As	I	argued,	the	problem	is	just	that	the	externalist	proposals	reproduce	the	precarious,	broadly	Cartesian,	character	of	the	relation	between	mind	and	world	and	merely	invert	its	 description.	 In	 either	 case,	 the	 mind	 appears	 unable	 to	 distinguish	 e.g.	 between	whether	this	is	H2O	or	XYZ	in	its	environment;	whether	it	is	experiencing	a	red	table	or	merely	 the	 electrical	 stimulations	 generated	 by	 the	 evil	 neuroscientist;	 whether	 it	 is	experiencing	 anything	 real	 at	 all,	 or	 just	 undergoing	 an	 illusion	 or	 hallucination.	 The	subjectivist	 responds	by	making	world	dependent	on	mind,	 the	objectivist	by	making	mind	dependent	on	world.	
4. How	to	be	a	naive	realist	about	mind	and	world	The	blueprint	for	a	better	response,	for	a	view	that	genuinely	overcomes	the	Cartesian	predicament	rather	than	just	inverting	it,	can	be	taken	from	the	Wittgenstein	quote	that	I	used	as	one	of	the	epigraphs	for	this	paper	(PI,	§	429).	Wittgenstein	talks	about	thought	and	 negation,	 but	 his	 point	 equally	 applies	 to	 experience	 and	mere	 seeming.	We	 can	rephrase	it	as	follows:	when	I	undergo	an	illusion	or	hallucination	of	redness,	the	redness	that	 is	 not	 there,	 that	merely	 appears	 to	 be	 there,	 is	 still	 inextricably	 tied	 to	 the	 real	redness	that	I	experience	in	successful	perception.	I	cannot	explain	–	not	even	to	myself	–	what	it	is	that	I	appeared	to	be	perceiving	without	pointing	to	a	real	instance	of	redness.	(In	some	cases,	the	connection	might	be	more	indirect,	but	the	basic	point	still	holds.)	In	this	way,	mind	and	world	are	not	married	by	force,	as	it	were,	from	an	external	point	of	view,	 by	 making	 mind	 dependent	 on	 a	 feature	 whose	 presence	 or	 absence	 it	 cannot	detect,	but	by	arguing	that	misrepresentation	can	only	be	conceived	in	relation	to	and	as	a	deviation	from	cases	of	successful	representation.	Far	from	opening	up	an	unbridgeable	chasm	 between	 mind	 and	 world,	 misrepresentation	 presupposes	 successful	representation.	The	notion	of	content	is	also	tied	into	this	nexus.	Experiential	states	are	internal	states	
 of	the	organism	and	their	content	is	an	inherent	feature	of	these	states.	But	content	can	only	be	understood	in	relation	to	external	objects.	That	is	why	the	fact	that	something	visually	 seems	 to	 be	 red	 (square)	 –	that	 there	 is	 a	 visual	 content	 presenting	 redness	(squareness)	–	can	only	be	understood	in	relation	to	things	that	are	really	red	(square).	The	subject	can	only	fully	distinguish	content	from	object	by	understanding	the	bad	cases	of	misrepresentation,	by	distinguishing	appearance	from	reality,	by	being	able	to	think	something	like:	it	seems	visually	to	me	to	be	red,	but	it	is	not	really	red.	And	again,	bad	cases	can	only	be	understood	in	relation	to	good	ones.	This	means	that	 there	 is	a	sense	 in	which	on	the	view	to	be	developed,	perceptual	experiential	relations	are	prior	to	mere	experiential	states.	In	this	regard	the	view	is	a	relational	account.	But	it’s	not	an	austere	relationism	because	it	insists	that	both	the	good	and	the	bad	cases	must	involve	experiential	subjective	states	with	intentional	content.	So	like	several	recent	authors	(Dorsch	2010;	Schellenberg	2011;	McDowell	2013)	 I	 try	 to	find	 a	 synthesis	 between	 intentionalism	 and	 relationism	 (and	 internalism	 and	externalism).	Accordingly,	this	view	can	be	called	“relational	intentionalism”.	Let	me	state	its	main	tenets	as	explicitly	as	possible.	There	are	experiential	relations	–	which	can	be	reported	by	sentences	such	as	“I	experienced	the	monitor	in	front	of	me”.	But	these	relations	obtain	partly	in	virtue	of	experiential	states	of	the	subject	–	states	that	can	be	reported	by	sentences	such	as	“I	had	an	experience	as	of	a	monitor	in	front	of	me”.	We	 conceptually	 focus	 on	 experiential	 relations	 with	 factive	 reports,	 which	 entail	representational	 success	 and	 on	 experiential	 states	 with	 neutral	 reports	 such	 as	 “It	visually	seemed	to	me	that	there	was	a	monitor	in	front	of	me”,	or	with	counterfactive	reports	such	as	“I	hallucinated	a	monitor	in	front	of	me”.	States	are	present	in	bad	and	good	cases,	relations	only	 in	good	ones.	Experiential	states	are	 internal	and	subjective	states	 of	 the	 organism	 that	 have	 intentional	 content	 that	 determines	 conditions	 of	satisfaction.	The	main	task	of	this	paper	will	be	to	explain	the	sense	in	which	experiential	relations	and	good	cases	are	primary	relative	to	bad	cases	and	mere	experiences	/	states	and	thus	to	 address	 the	 epistemological	 worries	 which	 are	 the	 main	 force	 driving	 austere	relationism.	 But	 before	 I	 come	 to	 this,	 it	 will	 be	 useful	 to	 address	 some	 of	 the	main	misunderstandings	and	concerns	with	regard	to	the	notion	of	content.	
5. Some	concerns	about	content	The	most	tempting	mistake	about	content	is	to	think	that	it	is	somehow	‘between’	mind	and	world,	such	that	a	subject	would	first	refer	to	content	and	then	only	indirectly	–	if	at	all	 –	 to	 the	world.	 To	 think	 about	 content	 in	 this	way	 is	 to	 turn	 it	 into	 some	 kind	 of	epistemic	intermediary	between	mind	and	world	like	a	sense	datum.	But	content	is	not	between	mind	and	world	at	all.	Content	talk	just	refers	to	the	way	the	experience	is	with	regard	 to	 its	 intentional	 significance.	 We	 are	 not	 aware	 of	 content	 at	 the	 level	 of	experience	at	all	–	but	only	of	objects	and	of	ourselves.	Only	at	the	level	of	reflection	do	we	 become	 aware	 of	 content	 as	 distinct	 from	 object.	 Content	 is	 subjective	 and	what	
 makes	it	the	case	that	we	are	aware	of	certain	objects	but	not	others.	For	example,	right	now	I	experience	the	computer	screen	in	front	of	me,	but	if	the	content	of	my	experience	were	different,	I	would	be	aware	of	different	objects,	or	none	at	all,	even	if	all	the	external	facts	were	the	same.		 Content	is	therefore	also	needed	to	make	sense	of	the	good	cases.	It	is	important	to	emphasize	this,	since	we	tend	to	focus	on	the	bad	cases	when	thinking	about	content,	as	then	the	absence	of	relevant	objects	makes	content	more	conspicuous.	But	content	is	also	required	to	make	sense	of	the	bad	cases:	these	can	only	be	bad	relative	to	conditions	of	
satisfaction	set	by	content.	Experience	(as	a	state)	can	only	misrepresent	or	mispresent	when	 it	presents	 the	world	as	being	a	certain	way.	That	 is	 just	what	 it	means	to	have	content.	If	we	deny	content	in	this	sense,	we	make	a	mockery	of	the	bad	cases	which	are	essentially	 cases	where	 things	 seem	 to	 be	 a	 certain	way	which	 they	 are	 not.	 For	 any	hallucination	 or	 illusion,	 for	 any	 experience,	 there	 must	 always	 be	 an	 answer	 to	 the	question:	how	did	things	seem	to	the	subject,	how	did	it	experience	them	as	being?		 For	the	same	reason,	experience	cannot	be	“object-dependent”	and	content	cannot	be	“gappy”	in	the	way	that	has	sometimes	been	suggested	in	the	literature	(e.g.	Schellenberg,	2011).	The	idea	of	gappy	content	is	the	idea	that,	for	example,	there	is	a	gap	or	hole	in	the	content	of	hallucination	corresponding	to	the	hallucinated	object.	But	the	notion	of	gappy	content	has	things	back	to	front.	The	gap	or	hole	is	actually	in	the	world	and	can	only	exist	relative	to	conditions	of	satisfaction	set	by	content.	Only	because	the	experience	requires	the	 presence	 of	 an	 object	 in	 order	 to	 be	 veridical,	 does	 its	 absence	 turn	 it	 into	 a	hallucination.	If	there	were	really	a	gap	in	content	there,	content	would	not	require	the	presence	of	the	object	and	there	would	be	no	hallucination.		 The	idea	that	some	content	is	object-dependent	is	a	residue	of	externalist	objectivism.	It	makes	mind	locally	dependent	on	world.	It	is	certainly	no	accident	that	it	does	so	where	particular	things	are	concerned.	In	the	philosophical	imagination,	particulars	have	long	stood	out	as	paradigms	of	reality.	There	 is	a	direct	 line	 from	Russell’s	suggestion	that	particulars	might	actually	be	constituents	of	propositions	to	the	theory	of	gappy	content.	This	kind	of	mindset	is	also	reflected	in	the	importance	that	has	often	been	given	to	the	distinction	between	illusion	and	hallucination	and	in	the	closely	related	idea	that	content	must	be	completely	general	and	thus	cannot	account	for	reference	to	particulars.	Before	I	discuss	this	idea,	let	me	define	a	minimal	notion	of	content.	On	a	minimal	construal,	content	is	first	and	foremost	the	property	of	internal	states	that	sets	conditions	of	satisfaction.	Nothing	can	be	the	object	of	such	an	intentional	state	except	by	matching	its	content.	That	is,	an	entity	could	not	determine	itself,	so	to	speak,	to	be	the	object	of	an	 intentional	state,	but	could	only	be	that	relative	to	content.	And	conversely,	the	world	can	also	only	fail	to	satisfy	a	state	because	that	state	has	content.	The	minimal	notion	is	meant	to	formulate	a	bare	realism	about	intentionality	and	content.	But	intentionalism	is	often	rejected	because	a	stronger	notion	of	content	is	implicitly	or	explicitly	 assumed.	 I	 will	 now	 discuss	 some	 of	 these	 additional	 commitments	 often	associated	 with	 intentionalism,	 beginning	 with	 the	 notion	 that	 content	 must	 be	
 completely	general	or	descriptive.	This	 understanding	 of	 content	 still	 tends	 to	 be	 taken	 for	 granted.	 It	 is	 not	 only	manifest	 in	 the	theory	of	gappy	contents,	but	also	 in	 the	common	presupposition	that	content	 could	 not	 be	 irreducibly	 indexical	 –	for	 example,	 in	 Putnam’s	 (1975)	 classic	argument	for	externalism	(compare	Searle	1983:	ch.	8).	So	let	us	consider	a	twin	earth	scenario	here.	Does	my	experience	present	my	computer	screen	and	myself	in	completely	general	terms?	Does	it	say	something	like	“There	is	a	screen	there	with	certain	features	and	it	is	in	front	of	somebody	with	certain	features”,	so	that	this	descriptive	content	might	apply	 just	as	much	to	my	twin	on	twin	earth	as	 it	does	to	me?	Now,	my	experience	of	course	does	not	really	say	anything,	nor	does	it	really	present	anything	in	general	terms	or	 concepts	 –	because	 its	 content	 is	 not	 conceptual	 at	 all	 –	 nor	 even	 in	 indexical,	demonstrative	terms	–	because	it	is	not	in	any	way	linguistic.	Still	it	seems	clear	that	its	content	 is	 more	 akin	 to	 demonstrative	 content.	 It	 is	 certainly	 no	 accident	 that	demonstrative	expressions	have	generally	been	thought	to	more	immediately	latch	onto	perception	than	other	expressions.	Therefore	I	believe	we	can	say	that	the	content	of	my	experience	is	more	akin	to	something	like	“This	screen	in	front	of	me…”.	It	does	not	pick	out	anything	–	whatever	it	may	be	–	that	meets	a	certain	description,	but	this	particular	screen	in	front	of	this	particular	creature.	More	could	be	said	about	this,	but	in	the	present	context	 this	 should	 suffice	 to	 shift	 the	 burden	 of	 proof	 to	 those	 who	 assume	 that	perceptual	 content	must	be	general	or	descriptive.	One	can	be	an	 intentionalist	 about	perception	without	being	a	descriptivist.	Historically,	 the	notion	of	 content	originated	 in	 the	 context	of	 thought	about	 that-clauses,	propositions,	concepts	and	other	linguistic	or	quasi-linguistic	items,	and	this	has	often	led	to	content	being	identified	with	propositional	and	conceptual	content.	This	in	turn	 is	 why	 some	 philosophers	 reject	 the	 application	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 content	 to	perceptual	 experience	 (or,	 generally	 to	 ‘basic	minds’),	 because	 they	 rightly	 feel	 that	 it	cannot	be	understood	in	language-centric	terms	(e.g.	Hutto	&	Myin	2012).	But	I	think	the	proper	response	is	just	to	reject	the	language-centric	notion	and	embrace	content	that	is	non-propositional	and	non-conceptual.	I	find	it	hard	to	understand	what	intentionality	without	content	might	even	be,	because,	again,	what	should	bring	a	state	in	intentional	contact	 with	 certain	 objects	 –	but	 not	 others	 –	and	 how	 could	 there	 be	 a	 perceptual	experience,	where	there	 is	no	answer	to	the	question	what	was	experienced,	how	the	world	seemed	to	its	subject?	Similar	 remarks	 also	 apply	 to	 the	 austere	 relationist	 attempt	 to	 replace	 all	 talk	 of	content	 with	 talk	 of	 the	 phenomenal	 character	 of	 experience.	 Even	 setting	 aside	 the	already	discussed	problem	that	this	character	is	supposed	to	be	constituted	by	external	objects,	it	is	not	clear	how	this	attempt	could	succeed.	The	suggestion	can	hardly	be	that	the	phenomenal	features	of	perceptual	experience	are	non-representational	in	the	sense	in	which	e.g.	mood	experience	is	arguably	non-representational,	or	in	the	sense	which	on	some	 conceptions	 sensations	 are	 non-representational.	 This	 would	 seem	 to	 be	inconsistent	with	 the	 insistence	 that	 experience	 “brings	 our	 surroundings	 into	 view”	
 (Travis,	 2004,	 p.	 64)	 and	 can	 justify	 beliefs	 about	 it,	 which	 is	 absolutely	 central	 to	relationism.	But	then	in	which	sense	is	experience	supposed	to	be	non-representational	–	where	the	representational	includes	the	presentational?	Perceptual	experience	has	all	the	marks	 of	 being	 intentional	 or	 representational:	 it	 is	 about	 certain	 features	 of	 the	world,	 its	 subject	 is	directed	 at	 these.	 It	 is	 hard	 to	 understand	what	 the	 relationist	 is	driving	at	here,	unless	we	take	her	to	reject	any	notion	of	experience	as	an	internal	state,	and	/	or	to	use	a	notion	of	content	that	is	linguistic	by	definition.	Having	 addressed	 some	 confusions	 about	 content,	 we	 are	 now	 in	 a	 position	 to	confront	the	epistemological	worries	driving	austere	relationism.	
6. The	epistemological	worry	driving	austere	relationism							I	believe	 the	 central	worry	driving	austere	 relationism	might	be	put	as	 follows.	 If	we	accept	 the	 distinction	 between	 experiential	 relations	 and	 experiential	 states	 and	 the	claim	 that	 the	 states	 are	 also	 present	 in	 the	 bad	 cases,	 don’t	 we	 then	 have	 to	 accept	experience	in	the	sense	of	seeming	neutral	between	the	good	and	the	bad	cases,	as	our	epistemological	 starting	 point?	 And	 aren’t	 we	 then	 back	 in	 the	 original,	 Cartesian	subjectivist	epistemological	predicament:	things	seem	to	me	to	be	a	certain	way,	but	what	reason	can	you	give	me	that	they	really	ever	are	as	they	seem?	We	can	call	this	the	“plus	predicament”:	 what	 do	 we	 have	 to	 add	 to	 (non-relational)	 experience	 to	 defeat	skepticism?	From	 there,	 I	 think	one	 can	 see	 the	pull	of	 insisting	a)	 that	 experience	 is	fundamentally	relational,	and	b)	that	it	provides	us	with	reasons,	so	that	we	are	justified	in	beliefs	based	on	it	–	as	it	guarantees	we	are	in	the	good	case!	A)	here	encapsulates	the	metaphysical	aspect	or	version	of	relationism	/	disjunctivism,	and	b)	its	epistemological	aspect	 or	 version,	 the	 idea	 that	 being	 in	 the	 good	 case	 puts	 the	 subject	 in	 an	epistemologically	 privileged	 position.	 This	 instantiates	 the	 pattern	 that	 we	 already	identified	in	the	case	of	Putnam’s	content	externalism.	Broadly	metaphysical	intuitions	are	 invoked	 to	 support	 an	 externalist	 thesis	 which	 then	 is	 supposed	 to	 bring	 an	epistemological	 payoff.	 Some	may	 try	 to	 get	 the	 supposed	 epistemological	 advantage	even	 without	 the	 metaphysical	 commitment	 (e.g.	 McDowell	 2013),	 showing	 that	 the	former	is	really	the	driving	force.	I	 now	 want	 to	 argue	 that	 this	 reasoning,	 while	 tempting,	 “cheerfully	 accepts	 the	Cartesian	premise,	while	trying	to	deny	the	Cartesian	conclusion”,	as	Saul	Kripke	(1980:	145)	 put	 it	 in	 commenting	 on	 materialist	 responses	 to	 the	 metaphysical	 mind-body	problem.	 As	 John	 Searle	 (1992:	 ch.	 1)	 has	 shown,	 the	 typical	 materialist	 accepts	 the	Cartesian	 conceptual	 dualistic	 opposition	 between	mind	 and	 body	 and	 thus	 can	 only	avoid	the	Cartesian	conclusion	of	ontological	dualism	by	construing	mind	out	of	world,	that	 is,	 body.	 Analogously,	 the	 relationist	 accepts	 the	 Cartesian	 epistemological	opposition	 between	 mind	 and	 world,	 according	 to	 which	 experience	 is	 our	epistemological	starting	point,	from	which	we	can	raise	the	question	whether	we	have	knowledge	of	the	external	world.	The	only	way	then	to	avoid	the	subjectivist	conclusion	that	 we	 lack	 any	 such	 knowledge	 is	 to	 construe	 experience	 and	 /	 or	 the	 subject’s	
 epistemological	 position	 out	 of	 world,	 that	 is,	 purely	 relationally.	 But	 the	 Cartesian	starting	point	is	optional.		Before	I	outline	an	alternative,	let	us	think	about	how	relationism	is	supposed	to	show	our	 epistemological	 situation	 in	 a	 better	 light,	 so	 that	we	 feel	 warranted	 in	 rejecting	skepticism.	Of	course,	we	can	definitionally	tie	experience	to	the	good	case,	but	obviously	that	does	not	improve	our	chances	of	being	in	the	good	case.	To	put	it	disjunctivist	style,	we	are	still	faced	with	the	initial	disjunction	that	we	are	either	experiencing	something,	or	undergoing	an	illusion	or	hallucination.	Nor	does	thinking	of	experience	as	providing	reasons	help,	because	we	are	still	not	in	a	better	position	to	know	that	we	possess	this	reason.	Now,	it	might	be	objected	that	I’m	missing	the	point.	“Look,”	somebody	might	say,	“of	course	relationism	cannot	improve	our	chances	of	being	in	the	good	case.	The	point	is	just	to	put	us	at	ease	that	it	is	rationally	ok	to	move	from	experience	to	belief	in	the	face	of	skepticism.	And	only	a	conception	that	ties	experience	to	the	good	case	and	thinks	of	it	as	providing	reasons	can	do	this.”	That	the	point	is	to	declare	experiences	to	be	reasons	so	 that	we	 feel	 rationally	 justified	 in	moving	 from	experience	 to	belief	highlights	how	relationism	revolves	around	another	broadly	Cartesian	notion,	namely	that	our	response	to	skepticism	should	take	the	form	of	providing	a	reason	in	support	of	our	belief	in	the	external	world.	Philosophers	have	 suggested	many	such	reasons,	but	no	proposal	has	seemed	 convincing.	 Now	 the	 relationist	 suggests	 that	 experience	 itself	 could	 provide	reasons.	 But,	 as	 I	 will	 now	 argue,	 perceptual	 experience	 is	 ill-equipped	 to	 provide	reasons.		What	 are	 reasons?	 For	 present	 purposes,	we	do	 not	 need	 to	 take	 a	 stance	 on	 the	extensive,	 though	 to	 my	 mind	 largely,	 if	 not	 entirely,	 verbal	 debates	 about	 whether	reasons	are	states	of	affairs	or	mental	states	(or	propositions).	I	will	just	insist	here	that	whatever	we	say,	reasons	must	be	tied	to	reasoning.	That	is,	they	must	either	themselves	be	intentional	attitudes	(states	or	speech	acts)	that	figure	in	reasoning,	or	they	must	stand	in	some	relation	to	such	attitudes	such	as	being	their	object.	A	state	of	affairs	such	that	it	is	 raining	 could	 therefore	 not	 be	 a	 reason	 independently	 of	 any	 such	 relation	 to	 an	intentional	 state.	 Now	 the	 point	 is	 that	 the	 move	 from	 experience	 to	 belief	 is	 not	reasoning.	Experiential	 states	do	not	qualify	 for	 the	 roles	of	 reasons	or	 reason-making	states	because	they	lack	the	appropriate	propositional	and	logical	structure,	as	the	content	of	experience	 is	 pre-conceptual	 and	 non-propositional	 and	 does	 not	 contain	 logical	operators.	 Intuitively	 it	 also	 seems	 clear	 that	 the	 move	 from	 experience	 to	 belief	 or	assertion	based	on	it	is	not	reasoning.	Typically,	I	will	just	look	at	what	is	in	front	of	me	and	 say	 or	 think,	 for	 example,	 that	 there	 is	 a	 monitor	 in	 front	 of	 me.	 No	 reasoning	required.	Sometimes	I	may	squint	my	eyes	and	take	a	closer	look	at	what	it	is	that	I	am	dealing	with,	and	this	may	even	be	motivated	by	reasoning.	Was	this	really	a	mountain	lion	that	I	saw?	Are	its	back	and	sides	tawny	to	light-cinnamon	in	color	and	its	chest	and	underside	white?	Here	reasoning	directs	my	perceptual	attention,	but	that	does	not	make	the	 move	 from	 experience	 to	 belief	 reasoning.	 Rational	 capacities	 are	 manifest	 in	
 inferring	 bits	of	 information	 and	weighing	 them	 against	 one	 another	 in	what	Wilfred	Sellars	called	the	“space	of	reasons”.	Are	there	even	mountain	lions	in	Austria?	Might	one	have	escaped	from	a	nearby	zoo?	But	the	move	from	experience	to	thought	is	different	in	character.	We	do	not	need	a	reason	to	enter	the	space	of	reasons;	there	couldn’t	even	be	such	 a	 reason	 because	 to	 possess	 it	 we	 would	 already	 have	 to	 be	 in	 that	 space.	 So	experience	can’t	provide	reasons.	The	 notion	 that	 experience	 itself	 already	 involves	 rational	 capacities,	 as	 John	McDowell	(e.g.	2013)	in	particular	has	long	claimed,	so	that	by	perceiving	something	we	would	already	be	in	the	space	of	reasons,	is	very	implausible.	One	has	to	be	very	much	in	the	grip	of	a	philosophical	idea	to	think	that	seeing,	hearing	or	touching	something	is	an	exercise	of	 rationality.	The	 idea	 in	question	here	 is	 the	 idea	 that	we	need	a	 reason	 to	believe	 in	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 external	world,	 and,	 as	we	 saw,	 the	 only	 epistemological	advantage	 the	 relationist	 construal	 of	 experience	might	 be	 thought	 to	 have	 is	 that	 it	allows	us	to	 think	of	experience	as	providing	reasons	by	tying	 it	 to	 the	good	case.	But	given	the	implausible	consequences	of	this	idea,	we	should	consider	alternatives.	One	alternative	 is	provided	by	Tyler	Burge.	Burge	 (2003)	gives	similar	arguments	against	the	idea	that	experience	provides	reasons,	but	then	goes	on	to	distinguish	two	kinds	of	warrant:	 justification,	which	 involves	reasons	and	 is	accessible	 to	 the	subject,	and	entitlement,	for	which	neither	is	true,	and	which	has	to	do	with	things	like	normal	conditions	 and	 reliability.	 So	 Burge	 opts	 for	 epistemological	 externalism	 as	 against	McDowell’s	epistemological	internalism:	“Epistemology	must	acknowledge	elements	of	warrant	that	are	not	conceptually	accessible	as	reasons	to	the	warranted	individual	if	it	is	to	give	a	tenable	account	of	perceptual	belief”	(2003:	529).	But	does	the	move	from	experience	to	belief	really	need	a	post	hoc	3rd	person	justification	from	epistemologists,	who	do	reason	about	these	matters,	if	reasoning	about	normal	conditions,	reliability	etc.	does	 not	 and	 could	 not	 play	 any	 role	 for	 subjects	making	 this	move?	 And	 given	 this	inaccessibility,	 in	which	 sense	 then	 is	 entitlement	 really	 an	 epistemological	 and	 thus	normative	status?	The	natural	view	is	that	such	a	status	would	have	to	be	in	the	space	of	reasons.	Moreover,	as	Burge	points	out	himself	(2003:	537),	his	explication	of	entitlement	does	 not	 address	 skepticism.	 Nor	 could	 it,	 since	 a	 notion	 of	 reliability	 under	 normal	conditions	already	presupposes	the	reality	and	knowability	of	the	external	world.	But	then	it	seems	his	explication	does	not	really	address	the	most	fundamental	aspect	of	the	move	from	experience	to	belief	and	the	concerns	of	McDowell	and	others.	Faced	then	with	the	equally	implausible	alternatives	of	declaring	experience	itself	and	/	or	the	move	from	experience	to	belief	to	be	an	exercise	of	rationality,	or	of	dissociating	epistemological	status	from	such	exercises,	I	suggest	we	try	out	a	different	perspective.	
7. An	alternative	account	Let	 us	 not	 uncritically	 accept	 the	 Cartesian	 ideas	 that	we	 can	 understand	 experience	independently	 of	 any	 knowledge	 of	 the	 external	 world	 and	 that	 our	 response	 to	skepticism	should	take	the	form	of	providing	a	reason	for	belief	in	that	world.	Regarding	
 the	 first	 point,	 I	 propose	 to	 take	 a	 lesson	 from	developmental	 psychology.	 Let	us	use	actual	development	as	an	antidote,	as	part	of	a	bit	of	Wittgensteinian	therapy,	against	both	 traditional	 subjectivism	 and	 the	 objectivist,	 externalist	 overreaction	 to	 it.	 Let	 us	accept	 the	 false	 belief	 test	 as	 a	 criterion	 for	 understanding	 mind	 and	 so	 let	 us	 take	seriously	the	finding	that	experiencing	world	precedes	understanding	mind,	as	the	false	belief	 test	 is	 passed	 around	 four	 years	 (classical	 version),	or	 around	 one	 year	 –	if	we	accept	 the	 newer	 violation	 of	 expectation	 paradigms	 as	 revealing	 genuine	 belief	understanding	 –	but	 in	 any	 case	 certainly	 after	 the	 infant	 has	 been	 perceptually	experiencing	the	world.	The	rationale	for	accepting	the	false	belief	test	as	a	criterion	for	understanding	mind	is	pretty	straightforward	in	the	light	of	our	earlier	reflections:	only	if	a	subject	can	make	a	clear	distinction	between	how	things	are	and	how	they	seem,	that	is,	between	content	and	object,	can	it	clearly	separate	mind	and	world.	In	 this	 way	 the	 Cartesian	 question	 is	 turned	 on	 its	 head.	We	 can	 no	 longer	 take	experience	for	granted	while	asking	whether	it	ever	gets	the	world	right,	but	instead	we	have	to	ask	how	we	understand	mind	and	experience	on	the	basis	of	experiencing	world.	The	role	of	reasons	is	also	turned	on	its	head.	They	do	not	lead	us	from	experience	to	the	corresponding	 beliefs,	 but	 from	 beliefs	 to	 understanding	 experience	 and	 mind	 more	generally.	 We	 start	 by	 perceptually	 experiencing	 objects	 as	 being	 related	 to	 us	 (and	others)	 –	spatially	 and	 also	 causally	 (Searle	 1983).	 We	 stand	 in	 intentional	 and	experiential	relations	to	the	world	and	may	even	have	some	understanding	of	them	in	our	own	case	and	that	of	others,	but	we	don’t	yet	understand	that	they	obtain	in	virtue	of	experiential	states	with	contents	distinct	 from	their	objects.	Our	understanding	 is	still	very	primitive	–	somewhat	similar	to	the	deliberate	primitivism	of	austere	relationism	–	and	at	a	level	prior	to	the	differentiation	of	mental	and	bodily	features	(Schmitz	2015).	A	proper	understanding	of	experience	and	mental	states	more	broadly	begins	only	when	we	start	making	assertions	and	forming	beliefs	on	the	basis	of	experience	and	learn	to	resolve	inter-	and	intraindividual	conflicts	between	attitudes	by	means	of	reasoning.	In	 this	 way,	 we	 gradually	 come	 to	 understand	 misrepresentation	 by	 separating	appearance	 and	 reality,	 content	 and	 object.	 For	 example,	 I	 come	 to	 understand	 that	 I	mistook	a	lynx	for	a	mountain	lion	or	that	the	lines	in	the	Müller-Lyer	illusion	only	seem	to	differ	in	length.	How	to	respond	to	skepticism?	From	this	perspective,	the	possibility	and	actuality	of	misrepresentation	 can	 never	 lead	 to	 skeptical	 doubt,	 because	 to	 ascribe	 a	misrepresentation	we	need	a	reason	and	such	a	reason	can	only	come	from	what	(is	taken	to	be)	a	good	case.	For	maximum	clarity,	let	us	spell	out	this	argument	as	a	series	of	steps:		1. To	understand	experience	we	need	to	understand	misrepresentation.	2. To	ascribe	a	misrepresentation	(bad	case)	one	needs	a	reason.	3. This	reason	can	only	come	from	(what	is	taken	to	be)	a	good	case.	Conclusion:	Bad	cases	presuppose	good	cases.	Misrepresentation	can	only	be	thought	of	as	a	deviation	from	the	normal	case	of	successful	representation.	
 	For	example,	I	can	only	ascribe	the	Müller-Lyer	illusion	to	myself	because	I	take	myself	to	know	that	the	lines	are	actually	of	equal	length.	The	same	kind	of	argument	also	applies	to	doubt.	As	Wittgenstein	pointed	out	long	ago,	doubt	also	stands	in	need	of	reasons	(ÜG:	122),	 and	 these	 reasons	must	 also	 come	 from	 good	 cases.	 For	 example,	 the	 fact	 that	mountain	lions	are	not	native	to	Austria	gives	me	a	reason	to	doubt	that	I	have	seen	one.				 To	use	the	phenomenon	of	misrepresentation	to	try	to	raise	global	skeptical	doubt	is	therefore	 to	 misuse	 it.	 The	 skeptic	 overlooks	 the	 fact	 that	 when	 I	 ascribed	 a	misrepresentation	to	myself	or	doubted		my	representational	success	I	presupposed	the	representational	success	of	what	gave	me	reasons	for	the	ascription	or	for	doubt.	Doubt	without	reasons	is	not	genuine.	Not	the	person	who	accepts	the	reality	of	the	external	world	around	her	 is	dogmatic,	but	 the	 skeptic	who	doubts	 it	without	 reasons.	This	 is	because	 believing	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 sense	 experience	 does	 not	 require	 reasons,	 while	doubting	does.		 I	thus	agree	with	certain	relationists	as	well	as	with	proponents	of	the	factive	turn	in	epistemology	 that	 the	 good	 cases	 are	 primary	 over	 the	 bad	 cases	 and	 that	 a	 proper	account	of	perception	should	help	to	put	skepticism	to	rest.	But	on	my	view	the	skeptic-defeating	 primacy	 of	 the	good	 case	 does	 not	 consist	 in	 that	 experience	 only	 provides	reasons	in	the	good	case,	but	in	that	we	do	not	need	reasons	to	think	we	are	in	the	good	case,	but	that	we	do	to	doubt	that	we	are,	or	to	think	that	we	are	in	the	bad	case.	That	is	why	the	bad	case	can	only	be	thought	as	a	deviation	 from	the	primary	good	case.	The	skeptical	doubt	is	misplaced	and	not	genuine	because,	first,	the	move	from	experience	to	belief	is	not	an	exercise	of	rationality	and	therefore	in	the	basic	case	does	not	allow,	much	less	require,	 justification.	And	second,	once	we	have	acquired	the	reasoning	capacities	that	put	us	into	the	space	of	reasons,	these	capacities	operate	by	weighing	beliefs	against	one	another	and	resolving	conflicts	between	them,	which	is	why	rejecting,	even	doubting,	one	can	only	be	rational	on	the	basis	of	affirming	others.	So	global	skeptical	doubt	and	the	 attendant	 demand	 for	 justification	 is	 either	 misguided	 because	 it	 is	 directed	 at	something	that	 is	not	an	exercise	of	rationality	and	therefore	cannot	be	questioned	as	such,	or	because	the	relevant	exercises	of	rationality	already	presuppose	that	we	are	in	good	cases.	At	an	even	more	advanced	level	of	reasoning	we	can	also	cite	the	fact	that	we	have	perceived	something	as	a	special	kind	of	reason	–	one	that	specifies	the	source	of	a	belief.	While	 such	 reasons	 involve	experience,	 it	 is	 still	 a	 “conceptual	mistake”	 (Burge	2003:	529)	 to	 think	 that	 therefore	 experiences	 themselves	 are	 reasons:	 not	 only	 because	reasons	are	propositional	and	for	the	other	reasons	discussed	already,	but	also	because	in	 experience	 itself	 we	 are	 not	 yet	 aware	 of	 experience.	 Such	 reasons	 appeal	 to	 the	reliability	of	sources,	but	any	determination	of	reliability,	whether	under	normal	or	other	conditions,	already	presupposes	the	existence	and	knowability	of	the	external	world	and	therefore	cannot	have	a	foundational	role	in	responding	to	skeptical	doubts.	We	 can	 now	 explain	 the	 sense	 in	 which	 the	 experiential	 perceptual	 relation	 is	
 fundamental.	It	is	fundamental	in	the	sense	that	the	good	case	as	a	default	is	prior	in	the	epistemological	 order	 because	 it	 does	 not	 need	 a	 reason.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	experiential	perceptual	state	is	fundamental	in	a	different	sense,	namely	ontologically	/	for	 purposes	of	 psychological	 explanation.	 It	 is	 a	more	 basic	 constituent	 of	 the	world	because	it	is	present	in	the	good	as	well	as	in	the	bad	cases.	This	shows	how	the	present	proposal	 reconciles	 intentionalism	and	 relationism,	or,	more	broadly,	 internalism	and	externalism,	and	integrates	elements	of	both	into	the	view	that	I	above	called	“relational	intentionalism”.	This	view	is	intentionalist	in	so	far	as	experiential	states	with	intentional	contents	are	taken	to	be	present	in	the	good	and	the	bad	cases,	and	it	is	internalist	insofar	as	it	accepts	the	obvious	fact	that	these	are	states	of	organisms	located	within	them.	But	it	is	also	relationist.	It	also	accepts	the	obvious	fact	that	there	are	experiential	relations	to	external	objects,	and	it	holds	that	these	relations	are	epistemologically	primary	in	the	sense	that	one	needs	a	reason	to	think	that	there	merely	seems	to	be	such	a	relation.	Since	misrepresentation	can	thus	only	be	thought	of	as	a	deviation	 from	the	normal	case	of	successful	representation,	and	understanding	experience	–	clearly	separating	mind	and	world,	subject	and	content	–	in	turn	requires	understanding	misrepresentation,	the	view	is	 also	 externalist	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 experience	 and	 its	 content	 cannot	 be	 understood	independently	of	 reference	 to	 the	 external	world.	The	key	 insight	here	 is	 the	Kantian	insight	that	our	understanding	of	mind	and	world	are	interdependent,	transposed	into	an	unmistakably	realist	framework.	This	interdependence	is	not	to	be	confused	with	the	attempt	to	invert	our	interpretation	of	a	case	where	mind	and	world	are	out	of	touch	by	constructing	mind	out	of	world.	Once	we	see	that	and	leave	behind	the	excesses	of	both	subjectivism	and	objectivism,	we	can	be	naive	realists	about	mind	and	world.2		 	
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